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1 Introduction
Agents frequently wish to make contracts that are contingent on a future event (like any
insurance contract), but the enforcement of such contracts may be problematic if only
one party is able to observe the event. Even if both parties observe the event, this may
not be sufficient to enforce a contract. It may be necessary to prove to a third party that
the event has occurred.
The first attempt to incorporate this kind of information asymmetries in general equi-
librium theory was made by Radner (1968), who restricted agents to make contracts that
are contingent on events that they can observe. This is too restrictive, as the other party
may find it to be in his interest to honor the contract, even if a violation of the contract
could be concealed. Such contracts are said to be incentive compatible (Hurwicz, 1972).
Allowing agents to make any incentive compatible contract, Prescott and Townsend
(1984a, 1984b) showed the existence of optimal allocations and sought to decentralize them
through a price system. However, to induce agents to self-select incentive compatible
lotteries, such decentralization requires non-linear prices (Jerez, 2005; Rustichini and
Siconolfi, 2008).
Our purpose is to investigate the economic effects of asymmetries in the ability to
verify the occurrence of events, in the context of competitive markets (with linear price
systems). Our framework may be described as a model of general equilibrium with private
and incomplete state verification. While Townsend (1979) studied the effects of costly
state verification, we assume that to verify the occurrence of an event is either free or
impossible. State verification is incomplete, and this incompleteness varies across agents.
We consider a two-period economy with spot markets in both periods, present and
future, and complete futures markets (in the first period) for contingent delivery (in the
second period). In the present, being uncertain about the future state of nature, agents
trade in the spot markets and in the futures markets. The trade in the spot markets
determines present consumption (goods are assumed to be non-durable). The contracts
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made in the futures markets determine the bundle that the agents have the right to receive
in each of the possible future states of nature. In the second-period spot markets, agents
sell the bundle that is delivered to them, together with their second period endowments,
to acquire their second-period consumption bundle. It is assumed that agents trade in
the present anticipating the future spot prices and, therefore, the bundle that they will
be able to consume in the future.1
This market structure coincides with that of Arrow (1953) and Debreu (1959). The
difference here is that agents are assumed to have incomplete and asymmetric abilities
to verify the future state of nature. Each agent has an exogenously given information
structure, which is a partition of the set of possible states of nature. In the future, with
the objective of enforcing the contracts made in the present, all that agents can verify is
that the state of nature belongs to a certain element of their information partition.
We assume that trade in the futures markets is mediated by profit-maximizing firms.2
In the first period, each agent makes a contract with one of these firms, stipulating a
net trade for each of the possible future states of nature. In the second period, given the
agent’s incomplete ability to verify the states of nature, the firm may have the opportunity
of delivering a less valuable net trade. We assume that, in case of litigation between the
agent and the firm, it is the agent that bears the burden of the proof, and that her ability
to prove that a certain state of nature has occurred or not is exogenous and described by
the agent’s information partition. The firm may choose, therefore, among the net trades
that corresponds to states of nature that the agent cannot distinguish from the true state
of nature. As a result, the agent always receives, in each state of nature, the less valuable
of those possible net trades (according to the spot prices in that state of nature). In the
spirit of the revelation principle (Myerson, 1979), we restrict agents to make trades which
induce truthful deliveries.
1This modifies the model of an economy with uncertain delivery (Correia-da-Silva and Herve´s-Beloso,
2008, 2009a, 2009b) by opening spot markets in the second period.
2This was also assumed by Prescott and Townsend (1984a, 1984b), Jerez (2005), Bisin and Gottardi
(2006) and Rustichini and Siconolfi (2008).
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It is assumed that agents cannot use prices to prove to a third party that a certain state
has occurred. This contrasts with what is assumed in the works of Radner (1979) and
Allen (1981). We rule out revelation through prices because it eliminates the information
asymmetries, thus rendering the model useless to explain their economic effects. Further-
more, allowing revelation through prices would lead to an implicit assumption that every
contract can be enforced. We assume that, even if prices allow an agent to infer the true
state of nature, this is useless as a means of enforcing contracts.
In our framework, there are contracts which cannot be enforced because agents have
incomplete information. Markets are, therefore, incomplete. But in a fundamentally
different way from that considered by Radner (1972) and Magill and Quinzii (1996).
Here, each agent faces different trade possibilities, which are, in addition, endogenous.
The “Hidden Information Economy” of Bisin and Gottardi (1999) is closely related
to ours. The main differences are the following: (i) they consider an aggregate shock
that is publicly observed and an idiosyncratic shock that is privately observed, while we
consider the more general case of uncertainty described by a set of future states of nature
and private verification described by agent-specific information partitions; (ii) we allow
for state-dependent preferences and consider concave utility functions instead of strictly
concave; (iii) we consider a single agent of each type, instead of countably many; (iv)
we consider a complete set of markets for contingent delivery, while they only consider
securities that are payable in a nummeraire good; (v) we suppose that each agent can
only use her information to enforce contracts, while they allow the outcome of trade for
one agent to depend on messages that are sent by others.
Our main result is the proof of existence of equilibrium, under standard assumptions.
The usual techniques are not sufficient because, as a consequence of restricting agents to
make trades that induce truthful delivery, the choice set is not lower hemicontinuous with
respect to prices. Adapting a technique used in a related contribution (Correia-da-Silva
and Herve´s-Beloso, 2009b), we start by constructing a sequence of economies in which a
violation of the truthful delivery restrictions is possible, but implies utility penalties that
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are increasingly harsh along the sequence. After obtaining the corresponding sequence of
equilibria, we prove that an accumulation point of this sequence is an equilibrium of the
economy under study.
We illustrate our equilibrium concept by way of a simple insurance example. In this
example, it turns out that agents are able to attain the optimal allocation of risk-bearing
(as in the case of complete information). However, if we restrict the deliveries contracted
in the futures markets to be payable in a numeraire good, then the optimal allocation of
risk-bearing is not attainable. This contrasts with the result obtained by Arrow (1953)
for economies with public state verification.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model of a two-period
economy with private state verification and establish existence of equilibrium. In Section
3, we present and discuss an illustrative example. In Section 4, we conclude the paper
with some remarks.
2 The model
We consider an economy that extends over two time periods, the present (τ = 0) and the
future (τ = 1), in which a finite number of agents, I = {1, ..., I}, trade a finite number
of commodities, L = {1, ..., L}.
In the present, there is uncertainty about the state of the environment that will prevail
in the future. There is a finite set of possible states of nature, S = {1, ..., S}, and agents
agree that the probabilities of occurrence of each state are given by µ ∈ ∆S.
Each agent’s private information is described by a partition of S. Agent i knows that
if state s occurs, she will only be able to prove that the state of nature belongs to the
element of her information partition that contains s, which is denoted by P i(s).
The initial endowments of agent i are ei0 ∈ IRL+ and ei1 ∈ IRSL+ .
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Assumption 1 (Endowments).
The endowments of each agent are strictly positive: ei0  0 and ei1  0, ∀i ∈ I.
The agent’s preferences about consumption in both periods, (xi0, x
i
1), are described by
an utility function, U i : IRL+ × IRSL+ → IR.
Assumption 2 (Preferences).
The utility functions of the agents are continuous, concave and strictly increasing.3
There are spot markets at τ = 0 and at τ = 1, and futures markets at τ = 0 for
contingent delivery at τ = 1. The deliveries contracted in the futures markets may be
conditional on the occurrence of any event (set of states of nature), thus each agent i
chooses a plan of net deliveries, specifying what she should receive in each state of nature,
yi = (yi(1), ..., yi(s), ..., yi(S)) ∈ IRSL.
The prices in the spot markets are denoted by p0 and p1, and prices in the futures
markets are denoted by q. We normalize prices by imposing that (p0, q) ∈ ∆L+SL and
that p1(s) ∈ ∆L, for each s ∈ S.
At τ = 0, agent i trades her endowments, ei0, for a consumption bundle, x
i
0 ∈ IRL+, and
a plan of future net deliveries, yi ∈ IRSL. The corresponding budget restriction is:
(
xi0, y
i
) ∈ Bi (p0, q) = {(z0, w) ∈ IRL+ × IRSL : p0 · z0 + q · w ≤ p0 · ei0} .
Trade in the futures markets is mediated by profit-maximizing intermediaries, who
are also price takers. The relationship between agents and financial intermediaries is
asymmetric, as it is the agent that bears the burden of proof. At τ = 1, if state s occurs,
each agent i can only prove that the state of nature belongs to P i(s), therefore, the
3By strictly increasing, it is meant that an increase in consumption of any of the goods is strictly
desired by the agents: (xi0, x
i
1) ≥ (zi0, zi1) and (xi0, xi1) 6= (zi0, zi1) implies that U i(xi0, xi1) > U i(zi0, zi1).
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financial intermediaries decide which of the alternatives among {yi(t)}t∈P i(s) is delivered to
each agent i.4 Profit maximization implies that only the cheapest alternatives, according
to p1(s), may be delivered.
Hence, agents receive, in each state s, one of the cheapest bundles among those that
they cannot prove, using only P i(s), that are not the truthful delivery.5 Accordingly,
we can restrict (without loss of generality) the choice of agent i to satisfy the following
restrictions, which induce truthful delivery:6
yi ∈ Di(p1) =
{
w ∈ IRSL : p1(s) · w(s) ≤ p1(s) · w(t), ∀t ∈ P i(s),∀s ∈ S
}
.
At τ = 1, in state s, agent i receives yi(s) (truthful delivery), which she trades, together
with her endowments, ei1(s), for a consumption bundle, x
i
1(s) ∈ IRL+. The corresponding
budget restriction is:
xi1(s) ∈ Bis(p1(s), yi(s)) =
{
z1(s) ∈ IRL+ : p1(s) · z1(s) ≤ p1(s) ·
[
yi(s) + ei1(s)
]}
.
The budget set for future consumption in all states, Bi1(p1, y
i), is defined as follows:
xi1 ∈ Bi1(p1, yi) ⇔ xi1(s) ∈ Bis(p1(s), yi(s)),∀s ∈ S.
Let xi = (xi0, y
i, xi1), e
i = (ei0, 0, e
i
1) and p = (p0, q, p1). We write x
i ∈ Bi(p) whenever
(xi0, y
i) ∈ Bi0(p0, q) and xi1 ∈ Bi1(p1, yi).
The choice set of agent i is, therefore:
Ci(p) =
{
xi =
(
xi0, y
i, xi1
) ∈ IRL+ × IRSL × IRSL+ : xi ∈ Bi(p) ∧ yi ∈ Di(p1)} .
4It is assumed that the information conveyed by prices cannot be used to enforce contracts.
5See Correia-da-Silva and Herve´s-Beloso (2008, 2009a, 2009b) for a more detailed justification.
6The choice of yi /∈ Di(p1) would never be optimal, as it would lead to the delivery of some wi ∈ Di(p1),
cheaper than yi. The agent would be better off by choosing wi instead of yi.
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In sum, the problem of agent i can be written as:
max U i(xi0, x
i
1)
s.t. p0 · xi0 + q · yi ≤ p0 · ei0,
p1(s) · xi1(s) ≤ p1(s) · yi(s) + p1(s) · ei1(s), ∀s ∈ S,
p1(s) · yi(s) ≤ p1(s) · yi(t), ∀t ∈ P i(s), ∀s ∈ S.
Or, equivalently, as:
max U i(xi0, x
i
1) s.t. x
i ∈ Ci(p).
The choice of the financial intermediaries is denoted xf =
(
xf0 , y
f , xf1
)
∈ Bf (p), where
the choice set, Bf (p), is defined as Bi(p) but with null endowments.7 We assume that
they wish to maximize an objective function that is strictly increasing:8
max U f
(
xf0 , x
f
1
)
s.t. xf ∈ Bf (p).
The demand of the financial intermediaries becomes unbounded whenever, for some
state s, the relative prices in the spot markets at τ = 1 are different from the relative prices
in the futures markets for contingent delivery in this state. That is, there are arbitrage
opportunities unless we have q(s) parallel to p1(s), for all s ∈ S. If, for every state of
nature, the prices in the futures markets and the prices in the spot markets are parallel,
the financial intermediaries cannot obtain any positive consumption plan,
(
xf0 , x
f
1
)
6= 0,
and are, therefore, indifferent among any alternative in their choice set:
q(s) ‖ p1(s), ∀s ∈ S ⇒ q · yf = 0,∀xf ∈ Bf (p).
7As long as free entry is allowed, the number of financial intermediaries is irrelevant. We can assume
that they behave as a single intermediary.
8It should be clear that any weighted function of their present and future profits is a particular case.
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Hence, from now on, we will restrict our search for equilibrium prices to the following
set of no arbitrage price systems:
P = {(p0, q, p1) ∈ ∆L+SL ×∆L : ∀s ∈ S, q(s) ‖ p1(s)} ,
and suppose that the financial intermediaries clear the futures markets by choosing:
xf =
(
0, yf , 0
)
, with yf = −
∑
i∈I
yi,
which is an optimal choice that belongs to their choice set.
If agents make optimal choices and markets clear, the economy is in equilibrium.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium).
An equilibrium of an economy, E = {ei, U i, P i}i∈I, is a pair (x∗, p∗), where x∗ is a vector
of individual choices, x∗ = {xi∗}i∈I, and p∗ ∈ P is a price system, satisfying:
(i) xi∗ ∈ argmax
z∈Ci(p∗)
U i(z0, z1), ∀i ∈ I [individual optimality];
(ii)
∑
i∈I
(
xi∗0 , x
i∗
1
)
=
∑
i∈I
(
ei0, e
i
1
)
[feasibility].
To establish existence of equilibrium, we construct a sequence of economies in which the
choice set of each agent i is Bi(p) instead of Ci(p). However, the choice of an xi /∈ Ci(p)
implies a utility penalty that is increasingly harsher along the sequence of economies.
After obtaining a corresponding sequence of equilibria, we prove that an accumulation
point (which exists) is an equilibrium of the original economy.9 Under Assumptions 1 and
2, existence of equilibrium is guaranteed.
9If the correspondences from prices to the choice sets, Ci(p), were continuous, it would be straightfor-
ward to establish existence of equilibrium (Debreu, 1952). But the choice correspondences are not lower
hemicontinuous. This property fails when prices in some state are null (∃s : p1(s) = 0) or when prices
in two indistinguished states are collinear (∃s, t ∈ Pi(s), k ∈ IR++ : p1(s) = kp1(t)).
9
Theorem 1 (Existence).
There exists an equilibrium of the economy E = {ei, Ui, Pi}i∈I.
The welfare theorems do not necessarily hold. The informational asymmetry may
generate an inefficient allocation of risk-bearing, because the uninformed agents may not
be able to make the desired wealth transfers across states and time.
Interestingly, the existence of markets for the future delivery of various goods (as
opposed to contingent claims that are only payable in the numeraire good) generates
further possibilities for the transference of wealth across states and time. We show this
by way of an example, presented below, in which a complete set of contingent markets
allows agents to arrive at the optimal allocation of risk-bearing (the same as in the case of
complete information), while securities are not sufficient. This contrasts with the general
result obtained by Arrow (1953) for the case of public state verification.
3 An example
Consider an economy with two agents who have the same preferences and the same present
endowment. They differ in their future endowments: while agent A has a certain future
endowment, agent B has a risky one. This is a classic setup, in which agent A should
provide insurance to agent B in exchange for a premium. But here we introduce an
obstacle to trade, by assuming that agent A will not be able to verify the realization of
the endowment of agent B.
We denote by xisl the quantity of good l ∈ {1, 2} that is consumed by agent i ∈ {1, 2}
in state s ∈ {0} ∪ {1, 2}, where 0 stands for the present and {1, 2} is the set of possible
future states of nature. The corresponding spot price is denoted by psl. In the futures
markets, quantities and prices are denoted by yisl and qsl. For compactness, a pair (zs1, zs2)
is denoted by zs.
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The preferences of the agents are described by:
U i = xi01
1
4xi02
1
4 +
1
2
xi11
1
4xi12
1
4 +
1
2
xi21
1
4xi22
1
4 ,
and their endowments are:
[(
eA01, e
A
02
)
;
(
eA11, e
A
12
)
;
(
eA21, e
A
22
)]
= [(2, 2) ; (2, 2) ; (2, 2)] ,[(
eB01, e
B
02
)
;
(
eB11, e
B
12
)
;
(
eB21, e
B
22
)]
= [(2, 2) ; (1, 1) ; (4, 1)] .
The problem of agent A, who cannot verify the state of nature, is the following:
max
{
xA01
1
4xA02
1
4 +
1
2
xA11
1
4xA12
1
4 +
1
2
xA21
1
4xA22
1
4
}
s.t.
p0 ·
(
xA0 − eA0
)
+ q1 · yA1 + q2 · yA2 ≤ 0,
p1 ·
(
xA1 − yA1 − eA1
) ≤ 0,
p2 ·
(
xA2 − yA2 − eA2
) ≤ 0,
p1 ·
(
yA1 − yA2
) ≤ 0,
p2 ·
(
yA2 − yA1
) ≤ 0.
While the problem of the fully informed agent B is:
max
{
xB01
1
4xB02
1
4 +
1
2
xB11
1
4xB12
1
4 +
1
2
xB21
1
4xB22
1
4
}
s.t.
p0 ·
(
xB0 − eB0
)
+ q1 · yB1 + q2 · yB2 ≤ 0,
p1 ·
(
xB1 − yB1 − eB1
) ≤ 0,
p2 ·
(
xB2 − yB2 − eB2
) ≤ 0.
For convenience of exposition, in this example we will use a different normalization
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from that of the general model, choosing good 2 as the numeraire. We set ps2 = 1 for
each s ∈ 0, 1, 2,.
Since the instantaneous utility functions have equal elasticities with respect to goods
1 and 2, the agents find it optimal to spend equal shares of their incomes in each of the
goods (in a given state). Therefore, in a given state, the relative prices of goods 1 and 2
are the inverse of the ratio between the aggregate endowments of each good:
p01 = p02 = 1, p11 = p12 = 1, and 2p21 = p22 = 1.
And it is optimal for the agents to consume quantities of goods 1 and 2 that are
inversely proportional to their prices:
x01 = x02, x11 = x12 and x21 = 2x22.
The relative prices in the futures markets must be, as we have shown before, equal to
the relative prices in the future spot markets:
q11 = q12 and 2q21 = q22.
After some calculations, we find that the deliverability restrictions do not constrain
the choice of agent A. The solution is the same as in the case of perfect information. This
is somewhat surprising.
The equilibrium prices and quantities are the following:
(p0, p1, p2, q1, q2) = [(1, 1) ; (1, 1) ; (0.5, 1) ; (0.577, 0.577) ; (0.343, 0.687)] ,(
xA0 , x
A
1 , x
A
2
)
= [(2.148, 2.148) ; (1.611, 1.611) ; (3.222, 1.611)] ,(
xB0 , x
B
1 , x
B
2
)
= [(1.852, 1.852) ; (1.389, 1.389) ; (2.778, 1.389)] ,(
yA1 , y
A
2
)
= − (yB1 , yB2 ) = [(−2.000, 1.222) ; (−2.000, 1.222)] .
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Agent A transfers wealth from state 1 to state 2 and to the present (while agent B
does, necessarily, the opposite transfer, from the present and from state 2 to state 1).
The equality of the claims for delivery to agent A in states 1 and 2 is not essential. We
remain in equilibrium if, for example,
(
yA1 , y
A
2
)
= [(−3.000, 2.222) ; (0.000, 0.222)]. There
is an indeterminacy of equilibrium related to the different possibilities of transferring
wealth across time and states using the available assets. But the equilibrium values of x,
p and q are unique.
With perfect information, it is clear that securities markets are enough for the desired
wealth transfers to take place, as shown by Arrow (1953). But with asymmetric informa-
tion, if there were only future markets for delivery of the numeraire good, then agent A
would not be able to make the desired transfers. Suppose that
(
yA12, y
A
22
)
= (−0.778, 0.222).
If state 2 occurs, agent A has the right to receive 0.222 units of the numeraire. However,
she cannot prove that the state of nature is not 1, in which she has the obligation to
deliver 0.778 units of the numeraire. Under the assumptions of our economic scenario,
she would be forced to pay 0.778 units instead of receiving 0.222 units.
Anticipating this enforcement issue, agent A would choose a pair
(
yA12, y
A
22
)
that satisfies
the deliverability conditions. She would choose yA12 = y
A
22, implying that x
A
12 = x
A
22 +
1
2
.
In this incomplete markets setup, the solution would be given by:
(p0, p1, p2) = [(1, 1) ; (1, 1) ; (0.5, 1)] ,
(q12, q22) = (0.642, 0.635) ,(
xA0 , x
A
1 , x
A
2
)
= [(2.153, 2.153) ; (1.881, 1.881) ; (2.761, 1.381)] ,(
xB0 , x
B
1 , x
B
2
)
= [(1.847, 1.847) ; (1.119, 1.119) ; (3.239, 1.619)] ,(
yA12, y
A
22
)
= − (yB12, yB22) = (−0.239,−0.239) .
With private state verification, the markets for future delivery of commodities other
than the numeraire play, therefore, a relevant role. They expand the possibilities for
13
wealth transfers across states and time. Agents are able to induce truthful delivery by
choosing, for delivery in each state, goods that are relatively cheap in this state but
relatively expensive in the other states.
We remark that, in spite of the fact that the relative prices for future delivery in a
given state coincide with the relative prices in the future spot markets in the same state,
the agents do not buy, in the futures markets, the bundle that they desire to consume in
the future (this would render the future spot markets irrelevant). In the futures markets,
agents select a “bridge portfolio”, not intended for consumption, but to induce the desired
wealth transfers in the absence of complete state verification.
4 Conclusion
In a seminal work, Arrow (1953) has shown that an optimal allocation of risk-bearing
could be achieved by a system of securities and commodity markets, with securities being
payable in money. This permits economizing on markets. Only S + L markets (where
S is the number of states of nature, and L is the number of commodities) are needed,
instead of a complete set of markets for contingent claims on commodities, which totals
a number of SL markets.
We have seen that if agents have incomplete abilities to verify the occurrence of relevant
events, then this is not the case. What was a redundance in the ways of transferring wealth
across states, becomes useful as a means of enforcing truthful deliveries. It may be the
case that a complete set of contingent markets allows agents to arrive at an optimal
allocation of risk-bearing, while a system of securities and commodity markets does not.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
We start by constructing a sequence of economies without differential information, {En}n∈IN.
In each economy of the sequence, agents have the same endowments as in the economy
under study, but modified utility functions. The choice set of each agent i is Bi(p) instead
of Ci(p), but agent i suffers a utility penalty if she chooses an xi /∈ Ci(p). These penalties
become harsher along the sequence.
In the economy En = {ei, U in}i∈I , the utility functions of the agents are:10
U in(x
i, p1) = U
i(xi0, x
i
1)− n
∑
s∈S
µ(s) max
t∈P i(s)
{p1(s) · yi(s)− p1(s) · yi(t)}.
It is obvious that, for any n ∈ IN, the utility functions, U in, are continuous. The maximum
of linear functions is a convex function, and multiplying a convex function by a negative
constant, −n, yields a concave function. Hence, the objective functions, U in(xi, p1), are
concave in the first variable. Observe also that the utility penalty preserves no satiation.
The plan xi + 1¯ is always preferred to xi (the utility penalty is kept constant).
To show existence of competitive equilibrium in En, consider, for now, the following convex
and bounded choice space:
X¯ = {z ∈ IRL+ × IRSL × IRSL+ :
(
0,−2eT1 , 0
) ≤ (z0, w, z1) ≤ (2eT0 , 2eT1 , 2eT1 )}.
The budget correspondence of agent i, in this bounded economy, is:
B¯i(p) = Bi(p) ∩ X¯.
10Notice that, since s ∈ P i(s), penalties are never negative.
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For each i ∈ I, let ψin(x, p) = argmax
zi∈B¯i(p)
{
U in(z
i, p1)
}
.
By Lemma 1, the budget correspondences, B¯i(p), are continuous with nonempty compact
values. Hence, by Berge’s Maximum Theorem, the demand correspondence, ψin(x, p), is
u.h.c. with nonempty compact values.11 It is also convex-valued, because U in is concave
in the first variable.
An auctioneer chooses a price system with the objective of maximizing the value of excess
demand. Since P is not convex, let the auctioneer choose prices with (p0, p1) ∈ ∆L+SL
and q = p1, and denote this space by Pˆ .
Let ψpn(x, p) = argmax
p∈Pˆ
{
p′0 ·
∑
i∈I
(xi0 − ei0) + p′1 ·
∑
i∈I
(xi1 − ei1)
}
.
This correspondence is also u.h.c. with nonempty compact and convex values. Therefore,
the product correspondence, ψn = Πi∈Iψin × ψpn, also is. Applying the Theorem of Kaku-
tani, we find that there exists a fixed point of ψn, that we denote by (xn, pn). To prove
that it is an equilibrium of En, we must show that it satisfies feasibility.
Suppose that there is excess demand for some good. If another good does not have excess
demand, its price must be zero, which, in turn, implies excess demand. Hence, there must
be excess demand for all the goods in the spot markets (at τ = 0 and at τ = 1).
Aggregating the budget restrictions at τ = 0, we obtain (recall that q = p1):
∑
i∈I
p1 · yi ≤
∑
i∈I
p0 ·
(
ei0 − xi0
) ≤ 0.
On the other hand, aggregating the budget restrictions at τ = 1, we obtain:
∑
i∈I
p1(s) · yi(s) ≥
∑
i∈I
p1(s) ·
[
xi1(s)− ei1(s)
] ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S.
11See, for example, Aliprantis and Border (2006).
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This implies that:
∑
i∈I
p1(s) · yi(s) =
∑
i∈I
p1(s) ·
[
ei1(s)− xi1(s)
]
= 0, ∀s ∈ S.
Therefore, p0 = 0 and p1 = 0. Contradiction. There is no excess demand.
The usual extension to the unbounded choice set applies, therefore, (xn, pn) is an equilib-
rium of En = {ei, U in}i∈I . Convert the price system from Pˆ to P , dividing each p1n(s) by
‖p1n(s)‖1.
The resulting sequence of equilibria, {(xn, pn)}n∈IN, which is contained in a compact set,
has an accumulation point, denoted by (x∗, p∗). This is our candidate for an equilibrium
of the original economy.
It is straightforward to see that x∗ is feasible,
∑
i∈I x
i∗ ≤∑i∈I ei, and that it satisfies the
budget restrictions, xi∗ ∈ Bi(p∗), ∀i ∈ I.
Suppose that xi∗ violated one of the delivery restrictions, xi∗ /∈ Di(p∗1), by more than
δ > 0. Then, for sufficiently high n, xin would also violate the corresponding restriction
by more than δ. For t ∈ P i(s), ∃n0 ∈ IN such that, for all n > n0:
p∗1(s) · yi∗(s) > p∗1(s) · yi∗(t) + δ ⇒ p1n(s) · yin(s) > p1n(s) · yin(t) + δ.
Utility among feasible allocations is bounded by U i(eT ), so we can consider a n0 that is
sufficiently high for n0δ > U
i(eT ) − U i(ei). It would follow that U in(xin, pn) < U i(xin) −
n0δ < U
i(xin)− U i(eT ) + U i(ei) < U i(ei) = U in(ei, pn). Contradiction.
To establish that (x∗, p∗) is an equilibrium, we only need to prove that each xi∗ is indi-
vidually optimal at prices p∗.
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Individual optimality of xi∗.
Assume (by way of contradiction) that there exists x′ ∈ Ci(p∗) such that U i(x′) > U i(xi∗).
We will show that this implies that (xn, pn) is not an equilibrium of En, for large n.
Observe that if p1(s) = p1(t) with t ∈ P i(s), the deliverability conditions imply:
 p∗1(s) · [y′(s)− y′(t)] ≤ 0p∗1(t) · [y′(t)− y′(s)] ≤ 0 ⇒

p∗1(s) · [y′(s)− y′(t)] = 0
p∗1(t) · [y′(s)− y′(t)] = 0
q∗(s) · [y′(s)− y′(t)] = 0
q∗(t) · [y′(s)− y′(t)] = 0.
Therefore, the agent obtains the same utility by choosing y′′(s) = y′′(t) = y
′(s)+y′(t)
2
instead
of y′(s) and y′(t). Define w ∈ Ci(p∗) by modifying y′ in this way.
By continuity of U i, there exists δ > 0 such that x′′ = (1− δ)w is strictly preferred to xi∗,
belongs to Ci(p∗), is in the interior of Bi(p∗), and is also in the interior of Bi(pn), for n
greater than some n0.
Furthermore, there exists  > 0 such that d(z, x′′) <  implies that U i(z) > U i(x∗i ), with
z in the interior of Bi(p∗). There also exists n1 > n0 such that d(z, x′′) <  implies that
z is in the interior of Bi(pn) and that U
i(z) > Ui(x
i
n) (notice that we are considering U
i
and not U in), for all n > n1.
Let n2 > n1 be sufficiently large for d(pn, p
∗) < ,∀n > n2.
To finish the proof, we will construct xˆ ∈ B(x′′, ) that belongs to Ci(pn), contradicting
the fact that xin maximizes U
i
n at prices pn.
Let k(s,t) = p∗1(s) · [y′′(t)− y′′(s)]. Since x′′ ∈ Ci(p∗):
t ∈ P i(s) ⇒ p∗1(s) · [y′′(t)− y′′(s)] = k(s,t) ≥ 0.
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Let dxˆ = xˆ− x′′ and dpn = pn − p∗. Manipulating a deliverability condition:
p∗1(s) · [y′′(t)− y′′(s)] = k(s,t) ⇔
⇔ [p1n(s)− dp1n(s)] · [yˆ(t)− dyˆ(t)− yˆ(s) + dyˆ(s)] = k(s,t) ⇔
⇔ p1n(s) · [yˆ(t)− yˆ(s)] = k(s,t) + p1n(s) · [dyˆ(t)− dyˆ(s)] + dp1n(s) · [y′′(t)− y′′(s)] ⇔
⇔ p1n(s) · [yˆ(t)− yˆ(s)] > k(s,t) − 2− 2‖eT‖.
Define kmin as the minimum among the strictly positive k(s,t).
Choose a smaller  > 0, if necessary, to make 2(‖eT‖ + 1) < kmin. This guarantees that
the strict inequalities for x′′ and p∗1 remain strict for any xˆ ∈ B(x′′, ) and p1n with n > n2.
If all k(s,t) were strictly positive, then xˆ would have no utility penalty. We would have
U in(xˆ) > U
i
n(x
i
n), which would be a contradiction (the consumption plan in the equilibrium
sequence, xin, would not be a maximizer of U
i
n).
If some inequalities are not strict for x′′ and p∗1, we need to guarantee that they are still
satisfied for some xˆ ∈ B(x′′, ) and some p1n with n > n2.
Select displacements from y′′ to yˆ that are parallel to p∗1, choosing:
dyˆ(s) = − 
2
p∗1(s)
‖p∗1(s)‖
.
Now define γ(s,t) =
(
1− p
∗
1(s) · p∗1(t)
‖p∗1(s)‖‖p∗1(t)‖
)
‖p∗1(s)‖. Notice that γ(s,t) = 0 if and only if
p∗1(s) = p
∗
1(t). Let γ
min as the lowest of the strictly positive γ(s,t).
Let 2 =
γmin
4‖eT‖ , and consider some n3 > n2 that is large enough for:
d(pn, p
∗) < min{2, },∀n > n3.
Consider an inequality that is not strict for p∗ and w′′, i.e., some kab = 0. If p1(a) 6= p1(b),
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we have γab ≥ γmin. This inequality still holds for pn, with n > n3, and yˆ:
p1n(a) · [yˆ(b)− yˆ(a)] =
= p∗1(a) · [w′′(b) + dyˆ(b)− w′′(a)− dyˆ(a)] + dp1n(a) · [yˆ(b)− yˆ(a)] =
= p∗1(a) · [dyˆ(b)− dyˆ(a)] + dp1n(a) · [yˆ(b)− yˆ(a)] >
> p∗1(a) · [dyˆ(b)− dyˆ(a)]− 22‖eT‖ =
= p∗1(a) ·

2
[
p∗1(a)
‖p∗1(a)‖
− p
∗
1(b)
‖p∗1(b)‖
]
− 22‖eT‖ =
=

2
p∗1(a) · p∗1(a)
‖p∗1(a)‖‖p∗1(a)‖
‖p∗1(a)‖ −

2
p∗1(a) · p∗1(b)
‖p∗1(a)‖‖p∗1(b)‖
‖p∗1(a)‖ −

2
γmin =
=

2
γab − 
2
γmin ≥ 0.
If p1(a) = p1(b), then x′′1(a) = x′′1(b) and dyˆ(a) = dyˆ(b). In this case, yˆ(a) = yˆ(b) and
the deliverability condition is also satisfied.
Hence, Uni (xˆ) > U
n
i (x
n
i ). Contradiction. 
Lemma 1.
In the bounded economy, the budget correspondence, B¯i, is continuous.
Proof of Lemma 1:
It is easy to see that B¯i(p) is upper hemicontinuous, as the inequalities which must be
satisfied are not strict.
Let x ∈ B¯i(p) and consider a ball centered at x with radius  > 0, denoted B(x, ). To
prove that B¯i is lower hemicontinuous, we need to show that ∃δ > 0 such that, for a given
p′ ∈ B(p, δ), there exists z ∈ B(x, ) ∩ B¯i(p′).
Observe that (x′0, y
′, x′1) = (0, 0, 0) strictly satisfies all the budget restrictions. Therefore,
any convex combination of x and x′ also does. Let x′′ be a convex combination of x and
x′ with enough weight on x so that it belongs to B(x, ).
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We have p0 · x′′0 + q · y′′ − p0 · ei0 < 0 and p1(s) · x′′1(s)− p1(s) [y′′(s) + ei1(s)] < 0, ∀s ∈ S.
By continuity, for sufficiently small δ, any p′ ∈ B(p, δ) preserves the inequalities. 
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